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Anatoly Baronin: Italy may leave the EU, but Russia will not fall apart yet. Modern Priorities of Italian Foreign Policy Italy's Foreign Policy

Central and Eastern Europe usually receives two types of the most important information from beautiful Italy: a football victory in an international championship or a foreign policy initiative that starts out great but then leads to such risky situations from which it is difficult to get out. Last Tuesday evening, the main Russian and Ukrainian news agencies reported on the statement of the Secretary of the Foreign and European Policy Commission of the Parliament, Micaela Biancofiore, according to which the Italian Republic favors the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and is ready to ratify it despite the fact that that the situation has become much more complicated after the seven-year imprisonment of the leader of the democratic opposition Yulia Tymoshenko, which effectively excludes Kiev from the list of free and democratic countries.

We have tried more than once to explain the position that leads in the right direction: Ukraine is a great country with agricultural, industrial and energy resources. In addition, the Ukrainian people are European in their culture and history, whose fate, distracted from those who rule them, deserves a much better fate than the new subordination of Russia. The situation of Soviet times is being restored, which is being followed by the recent decisions of President Viktor Yanukovych, extending the presence of the Russian army in Crimea until 2042, joining the CIS free trade zone, and intending to integrate Kiev into the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. All these decisions are not only being implemented, but their implementation is accelerating dramatically, which is increasingly pushing this corner of Europe into the arms of the Kremlin.

But what is most disconcerting is the further analysis of Biancofiore's statement, with the help of which she substantiates why the European Union should consider not only Ukraine but also Russia as part of Europe. In her opinion, it is with Moscow that the EU should unite its efforts on all fronts in order to resist the economic onslaught of China and India on an international scale. At first glance, this position seems sensible and reasonable, but in reality it is erroneous, and the Old World should not make this mistake. Most recently, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced his candidacy for a third presidential term and put forward a program, painted in overtly imperialist tones, aimed at creating a Eurasian economic community that should evolve politically along the CEE (Central and Eastern European) model and EU. But the primacy and control in the Eurasian space will be carried out by Russia.

The plan is already being implemented with the inclusion of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Tajikistan in a free trade zone, with the expansion of the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan at the expense of Kyrgyzstan, with an energy policy based on the renewal of long-term contracts to support dependence on the Kremlin of individual energy companies of the Old World, and most importantly, to prevent the introduction of a single EU policy. The European Union is an adversary that the resurgent USSR must first defeat in order to begin its ascent in the global economy.

Moscow's attempts to test its strength in military terms with the resumption of flights of Russian military aircraft near the borders with Estonia, Latvia and Finland, which were made a few hours before Biankofiore's report, are going in the same direction. Moscow Defense Minister Sergei Lavrov (Sergei Lavrov - Foreign Minister - translator's note), in an interview with the authoritative Serbian newspaper Vecherne Novyne, threatened to use force against NATO in response to the deployment of an anti-missile defense shield in Romania and Turkey under the North Atlantic Alliance project to prevent the danger of launching ballistic missiles directed against the West.

Russia is not Europe

In the face of all these facts, it is difficult to believe that there are common interests between the European Union and Russia, which, like it or not, remain two competitors in a globalized world. In this world, Europe runs the risk of being marginalized. To stay on the surface, to find the strength to continue growing, Europe must closely monitor what is happening on its eastern borders. She should understand that the resurrection of a strong Russia with its imperialist ambitions and a gaze directed to the West precisely because of its division and weakness is dangerous for it.

Finding a solution is not easy, but small but decisive steps would be enough. First of all, we must abandon the French-German idea of \u200b\u200bdividing Europe into the countries of the euro zone and all the rest. A divided Europe is not the right answer to the economic crisis that threatens to bring down the economies of Greece, Spain and Italy, especially if Central European countries are excluded from the club of the elite, the only ones whose gross national product is growing, and which contribute to maintaining a common boat on the surface. more and more sailing without a rudder or sails. Although the UK is notorious for its traditional anti-Europeanism, it has been at the forefront of proposing serious liberalization of the Union's internal markets for many years. This would be an adequate response of Italian diplomacy to the laughs of Merkel and Sarkozy. Thus, it would demonstrate itself as a real supporter of a united Europe, silencing the internal opposition, unable to contribute to overcoming the crisis, but only continuing to demand the resignation of the leadership.

The European and Ukrainian media regularly raise the question of whether Italy will become the "weak link" of the European Union. However, are there any grounds for such fears?

Ukraine and Italy have never been in the top of each other's foreign policy priorities. However, after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian-Italian relations were noted with an additional aspect.

Security issues were added to the traditional economic partnership, which caused Italy to have a problem in relations with the Russian Federation. It is important that Italy does not share the "cold war" discourse on the isolation of Moscow and treats the situation pragmatically: Russia will remain a significant player at the regional and global levels and therefore must be reckoned with.

Many Italian politicians today consider it necessary to return to the experience of their country, when during the most difficult moments of the confrontation during the Cold War, Italy, being a NATO member and an important US ally in Europe, maintained with Russia almost the best relations among all Western countries.

The position of the official Rome on the key issues for Ukraine of European integration and the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict looks like this:

Italy supports the EU's policy towards Ukraine both in terms of European integration and territorial integrity, but does not believe that isolation of Russia is a way out.

In Italian diplomatic discourse, such a policy is called the "double track" (doppio binario) - the firmness of the principles of international law combined with dialogue and negotiations.

Russian factor and interests in Ukraine

The dialogue between Rome and the Kremlin is really intense.

Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi paid an official visit to Moscow following the annexation of Crimea in March 2015. In the same year, in July, Vladimir Putin came to the world exhibition "Expo" in Milan. Despite the unofficial nature of the visit, Putin held high-level meetings: he opened Russia Day with the Italian prime minister and met with Italian President Sergio Mattarella and Pope Francis. In 2016, Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni visited Moscow twice.

However, the real balance of power in Italy can be characterized by the following formula: relations with Russia are important for official Rome, but relations with the European Union and the United States are more important.

As one of the interviewees noted, "Russia always counts on Italian support and is always mistaken, because the European and Euro-Atlantic community is Italy's top priority." This situation opens up new opportunities for Ukraine:

Rome's "flirtation" with Moscow makes the latter perceive Italy as its "Trojan horse" in the EU, while in fact it is Ukraine that has a hidden ally in Italy,

at least as long as the Democratic Party of Matteo Renzi is in power.

What level of support can Ukraine expect?

After the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Italian government circles understand: a return to politics business as usual with Russia is impossible. Italy's position is that Russia must respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the Minsk agreements.

Moreover, Italy is one of the few EU countries that have taken concrete steps to seize the property of Russians from the inner circle of Vladimir Putin. In September 2014, the assets of the oligarch Arkady Rotenberg with a total value of about 30 million euros were arrested. In addition, at the request of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine in the framework of a criminal case on the beating of demonstrators in Odessa in 2007, the San Remo police arrested ex-People's Deputy from the Party of Regions Igor Markov.

In 2013, Italy was wary of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, suspecting that Russia could start a conflict because of its signing. It was possible to hear from a large part of the Italian political establishment that Russia should be involved in consultations on the consequences of the Association Agreement, while Italy's European partners, in particular Germany, were accused of excessive haste.

However, Italy also timely and quickly ratified the document in both chambers of parliament (despite the general skepticism of the population on this issue: according to a survey conducted in March 2016, 66% of Italian citizens believe that in Italy, like in the Netherlands, a referendum should be held under the Association Agreement with Ukraine).

But it is worth recalling that Italy and Ukraine are valuable markets for each other. In terms of the volume of trade between Ukraine and Europe, Italy ranks third, behind Germany and Poland.

In turn, Italy is the number 1 country for Ukrainian exports to the EU. It accounts for 15% of Ukrainian exports, which in total exceeds the volume of Ukrainian exports to Germany and France.

Accordingly, Italy is interested in the implementation of the economic part of the Association Agreement.

Also, despite the migration crisis, which affected Italy most of the EU member states, Italy consistently supports granting Ukraine a visa-free regime. In this matter, the "soft power" of the Ukrainian community in Italy unexpectedly played a role.

In Italy, there are no fears associated with Ukrainian migration, thanks to acquaintance with the Ukrainian mentality and character (most Italians know at least one Ukrainian).

Thus, the issue of Italy's support or non-support for sanctions against Russia is rooted not in the strategic partnership between Rome and Moscow, but in Italy's desire to emphasize its weight in decision-making in the EU and to obtain certain concessions from European partners on other issues.

However, there is another problem - Italy is an ardent opponent of the idea of \u200b\u200barms supplies to Ukraine. On this issue, the position of the Italian government completely coincides with the sentiments of voters: 65% of Italian citizens are against such a decision, and only 22% are in favor.

However, it is important to emphasize that such sentiments are not anti-Ukrainian, but rather pacifist, like Italian foreign policy in general. Italy today professes a non-force foreign policy and is not ready to send troops not only to Ukraine, but also to Libya, despite geopolitical priorities and pressure from the United States.

No political friends, but a strong diaspora

There are no "natural" allies of Ukraine in Italian politicians.

The Italian political spectrum consists either of supporters of the fascist, right-wing tradition, who today profess conservative and radical views, or of representatives of the communist ideology. Russia is perceived by both the first and the last as a valuable partner.

Today the center-left tradition in Italy is represented by the ruling Democratic Party (derived from the Italian Communist Party), the right-populist tradition is represented by the Forward Italy, Northern League, and Five Star Movement opposition parties.

For the Italian left, Russia is the successor to the USSR. For the right, it is important to partner with Russia as a country that is capable of resisting the United States (however, anti-Americanism is also inherent in the left political forces in Italy).

This approach is also reflected in the press: both the left-wing Il Manifesto and the Il Giornale newspaper, the mouthpiece of the center-right Silvio Berlusconi, wrote about the Ukrainian fascists.

In this situation, the left looks nevertheless ideologically closer to Ukraine, since it is they who act in Italy as a pro-European force.

The fact that the center-left parties won the parliamentary elections in 2013 opened a window of opportunity for Ukrainian-Italian relations. To a certain extent, Ukraine managed to use it.

Since 2014, only Renzi and Poroshenko have met at least five times, including an exchange of official visits in 2015: in March, the Italian prime minister visited Kiev, and in November, Poroshenko paid a visit to Rome (the last time Ukraine was represented in Italy at the highest level by Viktor Yushchenko at 2008). In 2016, for the first time in the last seventeen (!) Years, Italian President Sergio Mattarelli is expected to visit.

However, the position of the Democratic Party is by no means unanimous. In particular, the public statements of its former leader, twice the Prime Minister of Italy and the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi regarding Ukraine have a pro-Russian tone. It was Prodi, when he was the head of the European Commission, who made the famous statement about his readiness to share with the EU neighbors "everything except institutions", that is, about his unwillingness to offer the EU's neighboring states the prospect of membership.

Ukraine also has friends among representatives of the Nuovo centrodestra party, which was formed as a result of the split of Berlusconi's People of Freedom party and after the 2013 elections formed a coalition with the Democratic Party.

Among them is the chairman of the committee on foreign affairs of the lower house of the Italian parliament, Fabrizio Ciccitto, who in May 2016 organized a conference in parliament on Ukraine during the arrival of delegates from the Verkhovna Rada. Paolo Alla, the coordinator of inter-parliamentary relations with our country, is also supportive of Ukraine.

Another spectrum of Italian politics is represented by such parties as the Northern League (14% support), the Five Star Movement (26% support) and the largest Italian party, Forward Italy (12% support).

These parties pursue an openly Eurosceptic and pro-Russian policy, recognize Crimea as Russian territory and advocate the lifting of sanctions. Their leaders do not hide their acquaintance with Putin or contacts with him.

It is important that these parties have a majority in regional parliaments, which has already become a problem for Ukraine.

This problem, in particular, was the result of the vote in the Veneto provincial council regarding the recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and the lifting of sanctions against Russia. Although this vote, initiated by the League of the North, has no legal effect on the actions of the central government, it creates additional political pressure and should be a “wake-up call” for Ukraine.

Also, the leader of the Northern League party Matteo Salvini visited Crimea after the annexation, and in March 2015 he organized a conference in Milan "Russia and Crimea: two huge opportunities for our enterprises ", to which he invited, in particular, the Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation for Crimea Elena Abramova and the" Minister of Economic Development "of Crimea Nikolai Koryazhkin. His party member Paolo Grimoldi initiated the creation of the Friends of Putin group in the Italian parliament.

Members of the Five Star Movement have also repeatedly served as retransmitters of Russian propaganda in the Italian parliament.

For example, at a parliamentary meeting, a member of the Italian parliament from the Five Star Movement, Marta Grande, spoke about the "filtration camps" that the Ukrainian leadership had built for the Russian-speaking population, and showed a photo with alleged evidence of cannibalism on the part of Ukrainian soldiers. As it turned out, this photo is from the Russian science fiction film "We are from the Future", filmed in 2008.

The long-standing friendship between Vladimir Putin and the chairman of the Forward Italy party, Silvio Berlusconi, has a long history and is not new. For Berlusconi, Putin is the number one world leader. It is also no secret that party members participate as "observers" at pseudo-elections in the self-proclaimed "DPR" and "LPR".

Interestingly, the Forward Italy party is still not monolithic on the issue of Ukraine's European integration, while the deputies from this party in the lower house of parliament voted against ratifying the Association Agreement with Ukraine, senators in the upper house voted in support of the Agreement, which besides, on the very day when Berlusconi met with Putin in the annexed Crimea.

Lacking strong political support, Ukraine has a large diaspora in Italy.

According to official data, in Bel paese about 230 thousand Ukrainian citizens live. It is the fourth largest community in Italy after Morocco, Albania and China, which does not belong to the European Union, and the largest Ukrainian community in Western Europe. Today in Italy there are about 100 registered Ukrainian associations.

Italy recognizes the role of Ukrainians in, without exaggeration, the social development of the state and is grateful to them for this. Ukrainian migrant workers have established themselves as honest and hardworking workers. As a rule, they are fluent in Italian and integrate into Italian society.

However, the Ukrainian community was not able to fully become "ambassadors" of Ukrainian politics and culture for Italians. Not all Ukrainian migrant workers are socially active in Italy as much as Ukrainian communities in the USA, Canada and Germany.

This can be explained both by the peculiarities of their status in Italy (sometimes illegal) and by social insecurity (Italy does not offer such a social package to migrants as, say, Germany).

In addition, not all Ukrainian migrant workers first identified themselves with Ukraine. Now Ukrainian migrants are more inclined to focus on their origins, but some still behave like "post-Soviet" people. For example, in May 2016, a Ukrainian school in Rome decided to celebrate a graduation party at the Russian restaurant Matryoshka.

Another link between Ukraine and Italy at the social level is Ukrainian children who were accepted by Italian families for a temporary stay with the aim of improving their health within the framework of the Children of Chernobyl program. In total, about 660 thousand Ukrainian children took part in this program, many of whom have learned Italian, have grown up and today work in various fields, including government positions.

Today, these people could play the role of Italy understanders in Ukraine, but their potential role in the development of Ukrainian-Italian relations has not been studied, much less used.

The next parliamentary elections in Italy are due in 2018. However, in the event of a negative result of the referendum on the constitutional reform, planned in Italy for October 2016, early parliamentary elections are possible.

The victory of the opposition: the "League of the North", "Five Star Movement", "Forward, Italy", representing Eurosceptic sentiments, may lead to a deterioration in Ukrainian-Italian relations and the cessation of support for Ukrainian European integration aspirations from Italy.

Although today Renzi's Democratic Party maintains a fairly high rating, the local elections in 2015 showed that the popularity of the incumbent prime minister's party dropped to 30%, and the candidates from the Five Star Movement won the elections for mayors of Rome and Turin in June 2016 ...

In such a situation, Ukraine now needs to look for negotiable interlocutors in all the leading political forces in Italy. That the Italian political forces are not homogeneous was demonstrated by the above-mentioned vote for the Association Agreement in the Senate.

In addition, it is worth establishing systemic contacts and cooperation with those regions that are supported by the opposition parties - first of all, Lombardy, Veneto and Liguria.

Finally, don't forget that Italians are a pragmatic and business-oriented nation.

Therefore, the best guarantee of Italy's support for Ukraine will be success stories - both of joint Ukrainian-Italian projects and of Italian business in Ukraine.

Solving problems that have hindered foreign entrepreneurial activity in Ukraine for years, such as VAT refunds and dividend withdrawals, will contribute not only to business relations between the two states, but also to political dialogue.

To revitalize business ties, it would be appropriate to create Italian-Ukrainian business clubs based on the embassies in Kiev and Rome or the Italian House Association.

The promotion of such sites could take place at the Italian-Ukrainian business forum scheduled for 2017.

Institute of World Politics

The publication was prepared within the framework of the IMP project "Audit of Ukraine's Foreign Policy".

The project is supported by the German Marshall Fund (BST GMF) Black Sea Regional Cooperation Fund, and the UNITER project, which is being implemented by Pact in Ukraine with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

If you notice an error, select the required text and press Ctrl + Enter to inform the editors about it.

Svetlana Sheremetyeva Tuesday, 10 January 2017, 08:05

Director of the analytical group Da Vinci AG Anatoly Baronin Photo: UNIAN

The difficult year 2016, which was remembered for serious shocks and conflicts, is behind. But also, which will affect, first of all, the European continent, says the director of the analytical group Da Vinci AG ANATOLY BARONIN. About which countries will be at the epicenter of events, how the situation in Syria will develop, what to expect from the United States and China, and whether the Russian Federation will not fall apart - in Baronin's interview for "Apostrophe".

2016 was remembered for many geopolitical upheavals, wars and conflicts. What do you expect from the new 2017? Which countries will be at the epicenter of events?

2017 will be a year of high turbulence and possible radical radical changes. First of all, Europe and the European Union, the Middle East and North Africa are in the zone of special attention. Also, one cannot exclude the possibility of certain shifts in the region of Central and Central Asia, which will be associated with a possible change of elites due to the fact that the time is coming for a natural change of regimes that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, I think that we will have the greatest risks in the European Union zone, and they will be associated with election campaigns, with the mood of voters, ethnic and migration changes that are taking place in this region.

- Are you talking about the upcoming elections in Germany and France?

To be honest, I would not put a particular risk on Germany, but would like to focus on France and Italy as key players that can start centrifugal processes in the EU. In France, it may be, which is now gaining good ratings against the backdrop of a rather severe migration crisis in France. Indeed, the number of refugees from Syria in France can be called catastrophic for those breaks and changes that can occur in French society. And also Italy, which is experiencing certain economic problems and a crisis with. We believe that there are rather high risks that Italy, following the UK, may begin the procedure for leaving the European Union, however, of course, this will not be as easy and unambiguous as it was in the UK.

- And why, when there was a crisis in Greece or Portugal, for example, such centrifugal processes did not take place?

Greece's problem is a unique problem of one of the few Orthodox countries in the European Union, which traditionally experiences economic difficulties associated with extremely low tax liability, extremely high corruption, the shadow sector, and so on. Therefore, Greece within the European Union must be considered completely separately. This is a country that from the very beginning did not meet the Copenhagen criteria, this is a country that from the very beginning had a fairly large latent risk potential in terms of balancing the economy, balancing debt obligations, etc.

- And in Italy?

As for Italy, here we see a completely different picture. This is a country with a strong enough potential for the left movement. We saw him after the crisis in '45, after the war. The left movement in Italy has always been developed. Now these populist movements are quite popular, I mean Mr. Grillo's "Five Star Movement", and Matteo Renzi himself was a fairly leftist prime minister. Their popularity suggests that Italian society, against the background of the crisis that took place in Europe in 2007-2008, is in need of change. Italy is quite seriously dependent on the common European policy pursued by the leading countries of the European Union. And, in principle, this policy does not really suit the elites who have their finger on the pulse of this country, so we see a certain popularity of such political forces as Lega Nord, which is a satellite unit of Silvio Berlusconi's power. And Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia party itself is now gaining popularity, since the economic problems that exist in the European Union (Italy has suffered quite seriously from the migration crisis), naturally, force society to reconsider approaches to European politics. There is a certain nostalgia for the situation when the countries of the European Union had a little more sovereignty in making certain decisions, for example, in migration policy, in foreign policy, and so on. It cannot be denied that the sanctions regime that was introduced against the Russian Federation, with the help of the propaganda of the Russian Federation, quite seriously puts pressure on small businesses and businesses that were associated with the Russian Federation. In this case, despite the fact that we do see some distortions, there is, in principle, dissatisfaction with the need to support sanctions.

- How can the crisis in the European Union stop?

I think the key issue of the European Union and the preservation of the European Union is its ability to react quickly enough to the risks that exist. And go for decentralization.

- What, then, should be the EU policy?

It is necessary to grant more sovereignty to different countries in issues that are a stumbling block, since, for example, migration policy is a basic destructive link that affects the countries of the European Union. We understand that, for example, if Germany, France and Italy opened doors for migrants, then forcing them to open doors for large migration flows, such as the flow from Syria, for countries such as Poland and the Baltic States, would be disastrous and lead to even greater unrest in society than what we see in France with the Marine Le Pen movement or the Netherlands, when the migration crisis with Syrian refugees affected Ukraine completely unfounded, but, again, under the pressure of Russian propaganda and those sentiments in society, which were generated by the imbalance of European politics.

- Why Ukraine still cannot get EU membership?

Ukraine's problem has always been the following: if you remember, since the mid-1990s, when the decision was made on the course towards integration into the European Union, the Ukrainian authorities have traditionally set certain deadlines. We have openly abused this practice, since we have declared that within five years Ukraine will join the European Union. After the first wave of European integration in 2004, the EU was already experiencing certain problems, questions were posed: can the European Union swallow such a number of the population of the new countries of Eastern Europe? Here, Ukraine has constantly set conditions. This was not blackmail, but it was speculation on the timing of accession. At the same time, Ukraine did not reform, we did not change, thus forming a negative attitude towards Ukraine on the part of the European elite. I believe that the current reaction of the European Union and the European political elite to Ukraine is a consequence of those gross mistakes that have been made from the mid-90s to the present time. When the Ukrainian leadership tries to impose deadlines for the fulfillment of certain obligations, without correlating them with the fulfillment of homework, which is set before it as a condition for obtaining certain results in integration.

Recently, the attention of the whole world has again been riveted on Syria. How will the situation develop there according to your forecasts?

The war in Syria will continue, despite the fact that there is information about the plans initiated by the Russian Federation on the division of this country. It completely coincides with our predictions that we made in October 2015. This is indeed the only option that Moscow can offer in order to put a tick in the process of resolving the Syrian issue. However, we understand that the solution to the Syrian issue, which is going through the process of federalization, will not eliminate the causes that gave rise to the war in this country.

Of course, we can say that the Kurds can also support federalization in order to gain expanded autonomy. However, we understand that they will not stop there. We see that they have changed their tactics, stopped talking about statehood and are now going step by step towards it. However, the fact that the goal is to obtain an independent Kurdish state is a fact. Therefore, we cannot say that the Russian Federation will be able to agree with the same official Ankara, resolve the situation in Kurdistan and prevent further attempts by the Kurds to create their own state. Likewise, with the position of Iran, which seeks to maintain influence in the western regions of Syria, where there is a high proportion of the population professing the Shiite direction of Islam (Alawites, Ismailis). Therefore, I am convinced that with 70% of the Sunnis who live in Syria, we will see a repeat of the situation in Iraq, when the Sunni minority under Saddam Hussein ruled the Shiite majority. Therefore, here the Russian Federation is behaving quite chaotically and does not predict its actions in advance, guided by the desire to simply tick the box that we have resolved the situation, they say, we will even change Bashar al-Assad to some other successor.

- What is Russia's interest in this Syrian story?

As you can see, wherever the Russian Federation enters, it does not invest money, does not start investments, there are no infrastructure projects. As an example, you can compare how China operates in African countries. Since the beginning of the 2000s, China has been very active in developing the territory of Central and East Africa, making colossal investments there, so even in areas where there is a certain inter-tribal confrontation, ethnic contradictions, China works quite softly, in principle, introducing financial resources there and so thus creating jobs, forming certain private military companies that protect their business. In this way, the Chinese guarantee the complete loyalty of the local population to them as people who provide jobs and money. And China receives material resources - deposits, territory, land, the possibility of cheap labor.

- Why is Russia so interested in the Syrian war right now?

It usually acts exclusively in opposition to the United States, its presence in Syria is not justified from an economic point of view, just as it is not justified from the point of view of the interests of the Russian Federation in the Middle East. Relying on Bashar al-Assad, a representative of the Alawites of the Shiite sect of Islam, despite the fact that the majority of Muslims in the Russian Federation are supporters of the Sunni sect, is rather strange and rather risky, taking into account the friction between Shiites and Sunnis (and in the Syrian war, the religious factor is already of enormous importance ), taking into account the ethnic and religious composition in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, we understand that apart from the deployment of a military base on the territory of Latakia, the Russian Federation is not able to offer Syria anything more, from an economic point of view. If, after 2003, the United States started its companies to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq, and we see mutual interest there, both on the part of official Baghdad and on the part of American business, such behavior of Washington in Iraq is understandable. At the same time, we see a situation where the Russian Federation spends resources on achieving a result that can only be motivated solely by opposition to the policy of the United States. In my opinion, this is a rather senseless undertaking that leads to a waste of resources, forces, image resources, but does not lead to the basic thing - an increase in the socio-economic well-being of Russian society through foreign policy. Today, the policy of the Russian Federation is, on the contrary, the achievement of political goals to the detriment of the socio-economic situation within its country.

The role of Afghanistan in the collapse of the Soviet Union is just an additional example of the very policy of senseless participation in foreign conflicts, not absolutely justified by socio-economic factors. Here we see, in principle, the same thing. The Russian Federation repeats the policy of the Soviet Union - it is a thoughtless presence abroad, participation and support in military conflicts of the parties, from which you do not get enough economic benefits. This is a situation when the economy lags behind foreign policy goals, which are determined directly by confrontation with a major player, in this case with Washington.

The Soviet Union's policy in Africa is the same situation. The USSR did not receive any economic preferences, there were no infrastructure investments, at the same time, there were colossal expenditures on military-technical assistance to regimes that were quite unstable, and the population of these countries quickly changed their orientation. Therefore, in my opinion, the Russian Federation may be subject to an even greater economic crisis. However, even despite a certain hidden separatism that is present in the Russian Federation as an artificially glued state, since there is a huge number of different ethnic groups, religious movements, and so on, it is still premature to talk about the likelihood of the collapse of the Russian Federation, in my opinion. For this, there must be even greater economic problems and, of course, a certain hacking is required in the police and counterintelligence regime that exists in the Russian Federation. Only after an internal opposition to the current regime has been created, it will be possible to say that the risks of the collapse of the Russian Federation will increase.

Now we see that Turkey is trying to take the role of a rather serious foreign policy player. What do you think Turkey’s policy will be in 2017?

In 2011, at that time, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu published a rather interesting article on the concept of Turkish foreign policy. In this concept, they considered three triangles, which are the basis for influence in the Islamic world in the Middle East. These triangles are formed from countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. This is, in principle, a historical concept, which is associated with the influence of certain countries on the Islamic world, their influence in the region itself on ethnic groups, and so on. However, we understand that with the Arab Spring, the influence of some countries has been undermined and some niches have been vacated. For example, Libya and Egypt have lost their importance, and a niche in North Africa has been vacated. Saudi Arabia has significant enough problems to increase its expansion abroad. After the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq also ceased to be a regional point.

Therefore, Turkey is seizing the moment. Erdogan is trying to restore the caliphate in the form in which it was part of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan's entire behavior after the so-called unsuccessful coup attempt is an attempt to form a new image and change Turkey's policy away from the one that was formed by Mr. Ataturk. In my opinion, Turkey will move away from secularism as the basis in state policy, the role of the army as a balance of the political system of Turkey will be reduced. At the same time, the role of the special services is likely to grow in order to conduct an understandable domestic policy, support the current government, and to carry out expansion. The campaign that Turkey launched in Syria already indicates that Ankara is sending unequivocal signals that it claims to have serious influence in the region. And here we can say that Turkey's influence will spread not only to North Africa and the Middle East, but also to the Turkic states of Central Asia, that is, to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, to some extent Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan. And here, I think, we will see changes already in 2017, since we already see the intensification of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Ankara, we see certain crisis phenomena in Turkmenistan, and we understand that he will be faced with the question: either go under the umbrella of official Beijing , or move towards rapprochement with Ankara. Most likely, Ashgabat will choose China as a softer power than Ankara, but at the same time we can say that Central Asia will be under increasing pressure from Turkey, which is again associated with an attempt to expand and strengthen its influence and return influence to the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

- What other countries from Central Asia will be in the center of events?

Afghanistan as a state in which there are two opposing key forces - the Taliban and the Islamic State, which is trying to gain a foothold in this country and strengthen its support among the local population. Of course, stability in Afghanistan affects the situation in Pakistan, for example. We understand the risks of destabilizing the situation in Pakistan, because Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon state. We also see a certain confrontation that arose along the Pakistan-Israel line, although I think this is a temporary situational confrontation. And, in principle, it is much more likely that India's confrontation with Pakistan will resume than that a new vector will be activated. As for Central Asia, I believe that the situation will develop in the wake of the events that will take place in the United States in connection with the election of a new leadership and the formation of the Trump cabinet, on the one hand. On the other hand, this will be determined by the activity of the RF policy in Central Asia. Strengthening or weakening it in this region will either attract or repel some of the countries that occupy a fairly significant place in this region.

- Will China somehow influence the foreign policy agenda?

We see Southeast Asia, China, which is starting to increase its influence in the region. It will be a game to the last, since China sees it exclusively as a sphere of its influence. We see that in 2016 he, in principle, managed to gain control of the Philippines, which were formerly part of the United States of America. This is indeed a great success in Chinese politics in their understanding, so I think that this signal will be followed by the ousting of the American-Japanese presence from the territory of Southeast Asia. How this will happen is difficult to say: either it will be from a position of soft power, or it will be an attempt at forceful actions, which we are observing in relation to the same Vietnam in the South China Sea. Most likely, China will remain faithful to its carrot and stick policy, when, on the one hand, a certain military power and forceful actions against the opposing countries will be demonstrated, and on the other hand, issues will be resolved behind the scenes, according to agreements, using significant financial resources.

China is much tougher in its far-reaching goals, but the very psychology of the Chinese forces the country to follow the path when the enemy or opponent is forced to take certain actions not through breaking the knee, as, for example, the Russian Federation is trying to do. This feature of Chinese policy, in my opinion, makes it possible to blur certain first signs of certain actions by China, which are quite clearly visible, for example, in the United States or the Russian Federation. This is the Chinese tradition of foreign policy, and it allows China to achieve its goals more gently, without going into confrontation with several participants at once. In contrast, for example, from the Russian Federation: when it entered Syria, there was an instant conflict with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia.

- And this policy allows them to achieve their goals?

They achieve their goals, but we understand that the original and main goal of China lies much further than the goal of the Russian Federation. China is considering total and complete domination around the world. The question is what is the time period for this goal. In fact, a feature of China's management system is a planning system, they plan in the short term, in the medium term, and long term. Moreover, their long-term planning period takes up to 25-50 years. This is something that no one from the countries of the civilized world does. However, such forecasts and benchmarks, in spite of the fact that they are then subject to correction, make it possible to orient the state policy towards achieving the final result.

After the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections, many do not understand what US policy will be this year. What's your prediction?

As for the forecast for the United States, here it is necessary to focus on several positions. First, the United States was originally created by the Founding Fathers with an amazing system of checks and balances, so if Trump's position contradicts the position of most congressmen, both from the Democratic Party and from the Republican, his policies will be completely blocked by Congress. Second: in the United States, the president acts not out of any authoritarian desires of his own, but on the basis of the agreements and interests of those financial and industrial groups that stand behind the parties and that have invested in the election campaign. If Trump's policies are unexpected for that part of the political elite that supported him in the elections, in particular for the Republican Party, this is the path to impeachment or blocking through Congress, therefore, in my opinion, Trump's policies will be quite unexpected on the one hand, but the general its direction in foreign policy will meet the interests of those internal elites who dominate the United States, including the military-industrial lobby, whose representatives are very strong in the Republican Party.

Svetlana Sheremetyeva

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Until 1861, Italy was fragmented, therefore, numerous Italian states pursued their own foreign policy, focusing on neighboring powerful states.

Since 1861, the policy of a united Italy was aimed at joining the regions with the Italians living there, namely the Papal States, Trentino, Istria, Dalmatia. Italy also sought to create its own colonial empire. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Italy annexed Papal States... Further, she was guided in foreign policy by Germany, as she wished to gain a foothold in Tunisia, which was also claimed by France... However, due to the desire to annex Istria and Trentino, Italy entered into a confrontation with Austria-Hungary in the late 19th - early 20th centuries.

Since 1914, Italy has been negotiating with The Entente, being in an alliance with Germany, bargaining with them. As a result, in 1915, the Entente countries promised Italy the desired territories if it agreed to side with the Entente. And in 1915 Italy attacks Austria-Hungary... According to the results of the Paris Peace Conference of 1918, Italy received Istria, Trentino and a number of islands in Adriatic sea... After First world war Italy has a new rival - Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenesin 1929 became Yugoslavia.

After the fascists came to power, Italy's foreign policy became extremely radical. Conflicts with Yugoslavia become relevant until the end Second World War, according to the results of which Italy returned Dalmatia, Istria Yugoslavia, granted independence Albania.

One of the most important foreign policy events was the signing in February 1947 in Paris of a peace treaty between the allies and Italy. According to the agreement, fascist organizations were disbanded in Italy, the occupation troops were withdrawn, borders were determined, and the deployment of military bases on Italian territory was prohibited. After World War II, Italy's policy was passive, the country followed in line NATO and the USA in particular. The country was dominated by the idea of \u200b\u200bthe role of Italy as the role of a "middle power". On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was officially signed in Washington. Together with representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Canada, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Iceland, the North Atlantic Pact was signed by the representative of the Italian government - Foreign Minister K. Sforza. Foreign Minister Sforza also actively promoted Italy's accession to the European Council (1949) and the European Coal and Steel Community (1951).

Italy at the end of 1955 became a member of the UN.

In April 1966, the first official visit to the Italian Republic of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A.Gromyko took place. The visit not only gave concrete results in the field of bilateral relations, but also led to a certain rapprochement of the positions of the USSR and Italy on various issues.

In 1972, the Italian government signed an agreement with the United States to provide American nuclear submarines with a base on Maddalena Island almost simultaneously with the signing of a protocol on political consultations with the Soviet Union. Soviet-Italian relations of the 1970s are generally developing along an ascending line, and are distinguished by great intensity and effectiveness. Further strengthening of relations was made in 1975 by the signing of the Soviet-Italian declaration, which emphasized the desire to develop friendly relations between Italy and the USSR.

By the end of the 70s, the passivity of the Italian side in Western Europe was compensated for only by banal rhetorical confessions of loyalty to Europeanism. At the turn of the 1980s, the Italian foreign policy pendulum swinging between Western Europe and the United States froze in the American phase.

In the late 1980s, this ideology began to change in connection with the events in neighboring Yugoslavia. Italy began to pay more attention to the processes in the post-Yugoslav space and in general in Mediterranean... In the early 1980s, Italy's Mediterranean policy was given a new impetus. The country was able to acquire significant independence from its partners in the NATO bloc and began to pursue its course in the region. Among the concrete manifestations of Italian policy at this time, one can name the conclusion of agreements on military and economic cooperation with Malta in 1980, the participation of Italians in the international forces in Lebanon in 1982-84, and the operation to clear mines from the Suez Canal in 1984.

Starting in the second half of the 90s, the problem related to the definition of a country in the European Union came to the fore in the foreign policy of Italy. First of all, attention was paid to the issue of the introduction of a single European currency, EURO.

Italy took part in the NATO Balkan operation, in Kosovo operationand also sent her soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the country, together with Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania, took part in putting forward a new subregional project - the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII). A conference at the level of foreign ministers was held on May 20, 2000 in the Italian city of Ancona and opened new channels of influence for Italy in the Balkans. Also, after the creation of the AII, Italy practically became one of the main Western European countries capable of regulating the post-crisis development in the Balkans, which gave Italy the opportunity to establish itself as one of the centers of attraction for the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

It was after the crisis in Kosovo there was a transformation of the idea of \u200b\u200ba "middle power" into the idea of \u200b\u200ba "world of protagonists" , that is, a world in which Italy has an important place. Later, Italy declared the Balkans an area of \u200b\u200bits "responsibility" within NATO.

After the events of September 11, 2001, Italy focused its efforts on restoring contacts between the Western and Islamic worlds.

Between 2001 and 2006, the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers made a series of visits to foster a dialogue between the Palestinian and Israeli administration, mediated by Rome, in resolving the regional crisis. For the first time, the state visit of the President of Italy to Turkey took place on November 22, 2005. K. Chapmi expressed support for Turkey's aspirations to become a member of the European Union, and also focused on the fact that the country and its leadership should make efforts to achieve the standards adopted in the EU.

The current stage of Italian foreign policy can be characterized by rather warm relations with Russia. Beginning in 2000, after the first official visit of Russian President V.V. Putin to Italy, mutual sympathy arose between the two countries, which subsequently actively develops bilateral cooperation. On the eve of the Russia-EU summit on 04.11.2003, the state visit of the President of Russia to Italy took place. This was already the sixth meeting in less than a year, which cannot but prove the active cooperation and close business relations between the two countries. A landmark event in bilateral cooperation was the signing in June 2004 of an intergovernmental agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to citizens of the Russian Federation and the Italian Republic, which facilitated mutual contacts for young people, scientists, cultural workers, entrepreneurs, and civil servants of the two countries.

Italy's foreign policy priorities include: Mediterranean, Balkan region, USA, European Union, countries Central and Eastern Europe,Russia.

Transcript

1 taking responsibility for difficult and unpopular decisions, conducting a dialogue with the political forces of the country and external partners are necessary conditions for successful internal and external transformations. IN AND. Mikhailenko * MODERN PRIORITIES OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY Several internal and external circumstances have brought foreign policy issues to the center of attention of the ruling elite and the expert community of Italy. Let's pay attention to the most important of them. First of all, this is the coming to power of the center-left government of Matteo Renzi, who proclaimed radical changes in the field of domestic and foreign policy. No one will give guarantees as to the feasibility of reforms of the “new wave” of a young politician 23. Italian analysts note that, first of all, M. Renzi needs to gain trust in the country and abroad 24. Another circumstance is that in the second half of 2014 Italy took over the presidency of the EU. And it is quite possible that it is Renzi who will determine the EU's foreign policy priorities for the period of office. It should also be borne in mind that M. Renzi has renewed the Foreign Ministry by nominating 40-year-old Federica Mogherini, 25, for the post of Foreign Minister, whose foreign policy experience is limited by the leadership of the Department of International Relations of the Left Democracy Party and * Valery Ivanovich Mikhailenko, Doctor of History, Professor, Director of the Department of International Relations, Ural Federal University the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin (Yekaterinburg). 23 His predecessor, Enrico Letta, devoted no more than six months of political life to the Renzi government. 24 Scegliere per contare. Sintesi e raccomandazioni del Rapporto sulla politica estera italiana edizione A cura dell Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Documenti. IAI Aprile R F. Mogherini was elected EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy in August 2014. ed. 27

2 relationships with colleagues from European Left Democratic parties and American Democrats. On April 25, Minister F. Mogherini wrote in her blog: "Today I had a long conversation with US Secretary of State John Kerry about the crisis in Ukraine and in connection with the telephone exchange of views with members of the G7." The heads of the foreign ministries expressed concern about the aggravation of the situation, reaffirmed the importance of observing the Geneva agreements of April 17, 2014 and holding the presidential elections on May 25. F. Mogherini announced her support for new sanctions against Russia "in connection with the deterioration of the situation" in the region. In addition, they discussed the situation in Syria and the peace process in the Middle East. The parties agreed to continue contacts and "strict coordination of actions, as has been the case until today" 26. Events in Ukraine and relations with Russia are among the priorities of the European Union's foreign policy. The Italian expert community is developing proposals for political leadership, taking into account possible adjustments in foreign policy. However, one should not predict radical changes in Italian foreign policy. Italian President G. Napolitano notes that since December 1977, when parliamentary parties reached "national solidarity", the basis of Italian foreign policy has been "participation in the Atlantic Union and the obligations of the Community". Naturally, the President of the Republic continued, this “does not exclude the possibility of differences and diversity of views on certain specific foreign policy choices.” 27 This article attempts to analyze the activities of some expert communities presenting the results of their research activities to the President, parliamentarians and the government of the Italian Republic. Our focus is on research activities 26 URL: 27 Napolitano G. L Italia e la politica internazionale. Affari Esteri. Autunno P

The activity of the Institute of International Relations 28, the Institute for International Policy Studies 29, the Center for Higher Defense Studies 30, the Center for International Policy Studies 31, the Center for International Studies 32. As a reference document this study uses a report prepared by experts from the IMO (IAI) entitled “Choose to lean. Summary and Recommendations of the 2014 Italian Foreign Policy Report " 33. A large group of Italian experts worked on the report 34. The “Summary” precedes the annual publication of the analytical volume “Italian Foreign Policy”, published since 1972 jointly with the Institute for International Policy Research (ISPI) 35. Analysts note that in 2014 Italian policy will continue to be at the center of the challenges posed by the global and European crises. The internal structures of the EU are in a state of uncertainty, and the situation is aggravating, which creates a breeding ground for the formation of centrifugal tendencies in the EU, activation of populist and anti-European forces. Along with these factors, the tensions caused by Ukraine may undermine the European security system 28 Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), founded in 1965 on the initiative of A. Spinelli, a politician and one of the theorists of European unity. 29 Istituto di Studi Politici Internazionali (ISPI), founded in 1933 in Milan, is one of the oldest centers for the study of world politics in Italy. 30 Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) structure under the Italian General Defense Staff. 31 Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CESPI), founded in 1985 as an independent center for foreign policy and international relations. Oriented towards cooperation with the Italian Foreign Ministry. 32 Centro Studi Internazionali (Ce.S.I.) was founded in 2004 by Andrea Margelletti, advisor to the Italian Defense Minister and one of the leading experts in international policy analysis. 33 Scegliere per contare. Sintesi e raccomandazioni del Rapporto sulla politica estera italiana edizione A cura dell Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Documenti IAI Aprile Roberto Aliboni, Giovanni Andornino, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Gianni Bonvicini, Vincenzo Camporini, Silvia Colombo, Federica Di Camillo, Ettore Greco, Alessandro Marrone, Ferdinando Pasalori, Piotori Ferocia, Nelli Pirata, Ferreccio , Stefano Silvestri, Nathalie Tocci. 35 Until 2009, it was called “Italy and international politics” (L Italia e la politica internazionale). 29

4 in relations with Russia. The situation along the southern perimeter of the EU is of concern, where, with the exception of Tunisia, the "Arab spring" did not lead to political stability in the Mediterranean region. The civil war in Syria continues, the situation with Iran's nuclear program is unclear, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not been resolved. The global context of world politics remains complex; tensions in the Asia-Pacific region are not decreasing. The reform of global governance is facing certain difficulties, which is under pressure from the advancing multipolarity and the changing balance of power between different countries. Experts note that compared to 2011, when Italy was on the brink of financial collapse, the financial and economic situation has improved, despite fierce resistance to reforms within the country, incl. from the side of the ruling class. However, there is still a lack of clear awareness of the path Italy is taking. This not only provokes mistrust in the public environment, but also narrows the space for the country's actions in the international arena. Recently, the European Commission stated that Italy “suffers from excessive macroeconomic imbalances that threaten the functioning of the economic and monetary union” 36. Analysts note “a very high risk of a fall in the economy due to a fragile banking system and explosive debt obligations” 37. Analysts believe that the government M. Renzi should not count on a revision of the control established by the European Union over the budget, deficit, tax policy and balance of public expenditures of the EU member states. They consider it counterproductive to abandon the commitments made by the previous government. The new government should not provoke actions that could lead to increased contradictions and tensions between EU members. The political space in the European Union is already inadequate. 36 Scegliere per contare. P Lombardi D., Amand S. Global Economic Trends and Recovery Prospects. Documenti IAI 14/05 April P

5 calm in connection with a possible referendum in Great Britain on membership in the EU, fragmentation processes in the same Great Britain and in Spain, the growing influence of parties holding Eurosceptic positions, difficulties in restarting the traditional Franco-German "motor". However, this does not mean that Italy is limited in its ability to negotiate with the EU governing bodies. To be successful, the Italian leadership must take into account the full context of EU policy, i.e. put forward their own initiatives that would be aimed at economic growth and reducing the budget deficit. If Italy reaches the level of implementation of effective reforms, then it will have a good chance of succeeding in negotiations with the European Commission. Thus, it seems possible to win back the loosening of Brussels' control over the Italian budget in exchange for reforms 38. Analysts believe that Italy has three main arguments to re-establish confidence in Brussels. The first is the consistent performance of Italy's solidary role as a European state. They consider it unproductive for Italy to “bang on the table”, which can ultimately lead to marginalization or even isolation of the country. Another argument is related to playing an active role in the European diplomatic game, establishing new ties and alliances. The Franco-German axis is going through hard times, but it is difficult to imagine who can create an alternative to it. Rather than looking for itself in alternative blocs, Italy should take advantage of the "fluid geometry of political convergence" that characterizes the expanding European Union to 28 members. For example, in June 2012, the Monti government managed to raise the country's international prestige by consistently defending the Scegliere per contare direct monetary operations (OMT) program. P The Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program was announced by the European Central Bank in September 2012 with a potential

6 Italy's presidency of the European Union should be used to engage national public opinion on the European agenda and to advance national interests at European level 40. During Italy's term of office, almost all positions in the EU have changed, as changes began after the May 2014 elections only from September. One of the most important tasks for Italy is to guarantee continuity and ensure the smooth functioning of EU institutions in connection with the new realities. In addition, the Italian presidency is responsible for the completion of economic governance reforms, including the banking union. Related to this is the task of the Italian government to reform the internal market, taking into account the program proposed by the European Commission and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership In March 2014, an expert meeting was held in Rome in Rome to develop recommendations for the upcoming Italian presidency in the EU 42. Italy was proposed the following agenda for the period of her presidency in the EU, namely: to seek more effective economic governance in the EU; promote new measures to create jobs; find pragmatic answers to the Ukrainian crisis and its consequences within the framework of the Neighborhood Policy; determine the future of the Common Defense and Security Policy; to push for EU immigration policy reform; to improve efficiency and legally unlimited purchases of bonds of the EU countries, which have been hit hardest by the global financial crisis. The OMT program has reduced the fragmentation of financial markets. See: M. Draghi OMT Program Helped Stabilize Financial Markets. URL: ru / economics / 26/06/2013 / shtml. 40 Scegliere per contare. P Agreement governing trade relations between the US and the EU. URL: 42 The meeting was organized by the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), the Institute of International Relations (IAI) and the European Theseus project in cooperation with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Delegation of the European Commission to Italy and the Center for Federalism Studies (Centro studi sul federalismo, CSF). 32

7 good governance of the EU 43. Analysts hope that the Italian presidency can help to enhance internal security and develop legal cooperation in the light of the proposals put forward by the European Commission in 2009 in the Stockholm program “For a space of freedom, security and justice” 44. Action Plan, proposed by the Stockholm Program envisages measures to be taken by the European Commission in the period from 2010 to 2014. in the field of freedom, security and justice. Among them are measures in the field of freedom of movement, judicial cooperation in the event of intra-European cross-border disputes, as well as consular protection for EU citizens in third countries. Regarding immigration, it is proposed to introduce a directive on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the seasonal period. It is also planned to automate the system of crossing the borders of the Schengen zone. With regard to the consideration of issues of asylum in the EU, the Stockholm Program provides for the introduction of a unified system of processing applications. In addition, it is planned to introduce a number of provisions concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters, free movement of persons within the EU, which include the mutual recognition of civil status documents (marriages, divorces, etc.) 45. The end of the work on the Stockholm program is marked 2014 Italy has an opportunity to play its leading role in introducing amendments to make immigration laws more effective. During the presidency, Italy can show itself in reforming economic governance in the EU, in negotiations with the UK on the "reset" of its relations with the EU after the 2015 parliamentary elections, thereby 43 Alessandri E., Koenig N., Siddi M. Priorities and Challenges of the 2014 Italian EU Presidency. Documenti IAI 14/07 May Piano d azione per l attuazione del programma di Stoccolma. URL: europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_europe an_union / jl0036_it.htm. 45 Piano d azione per l attuazione del programma di Stoccolma. 33

8 to play its positive role in restoring the equilibrium of the EU institutional system. Analysts pay great attention to the prospects of Italian foreign policy in connection with the "Ukrainian crisis". Some of them point out that the language in the document "European Security Strategy", given in 2003, is hopelessly outdated. The document begins with the words: “Europe has never been so prosperous, secure and free.” 46 Italian observers believe that further development The "Ukrainian crisis" not only endangers the European security system, but even goes beyond it, exerting a destabilizing effect on the foundations of the world security system that emerged after the end of the Cold War. This concerns the arms control regime, the dialogue with Moscow through the NATO Russia Council, the role of the OSCE in the field of security and human rights, the joint resolution of crises on the continent.47 In such a situation, Italian analysts state, Rome cannot deviate from the agreed line of the European Union regarding Russia. At the same time, the course towards Moscow, based only on intimidation and restraint of attempts at external expansion, seems to be erroneous. It should be borne in mind that a significant part of the Russian establishment is vitally interested in maintaining economic cooperation with the West. The absence of significant allies is fraught with the risk of growing international isolation, which in the long term can lead to structural weakness of the state and to the loss of control over border territories. In this regard, it is necessary to keep the door open to the resumption of economic, political and strategic cooperation all the time. A strategy with regard to Russia should include the search for mutually beneficial agreements with regard to border areas. Accordingly, there should be a rethinking of the policy of the Eastern Partnership, cooperation with the country - 46 Un Europa sicura in un Mondo migliore. Strategia Europea in materia di Sicurezza. Bruxelles. 12 dicembre P Scegliere per contare. R

9 us Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 48. At the forefront of Italian foreign policy remains the question of sharing transatlantic solidarity and burden within the framework of NATO and the EU. Italian bilateral initiatives with regard to Eastern Europe and Russia must be implemented in a European and transatlantic context. Otherwise, they will not only be ineffective, but may lead to isolation from allies and partners 49. This does not exclude the protection of special Italian interests in relation to the Western Balkans, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, active work within the framework of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, European -African cooperation in the field of security and development, the European-Asian partnership 50. Italian foreign policy interests in the Mediterranean are especially manifested. However, today there are no objective prerequisites for new initiatives, analysts say. The consequences of the "Arab Spring", or "Arab awakening", have become one of the priority targets for the "rethinking" of the EU policy in the Southern Mediterranean by the Italian expert community. A more or less agreed conclusion of the experts can be reduced to the assessment of the Barcelona Process 51 and other subsequent EU projects, for example, the Union for the Mediterranean 52, the European Neighborhood Policy 53, “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean” 54 as not achieving the intended Ibid goals. P Scegliere per contare. Р Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) // URL: 51 Marin M. Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Brussels: European Commission, Document COM (94) 427/5, 19 October Union for the Mediterranean. URL: s hared / import / 07 / 0713_declaration_de_paris / joint_declaration_of_the_paris_sum mit_for_the_mediterranean-en.pdf. 53 European Neighborhood Policy, ENP. 54 Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. 55 Re-Thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprising. Ed. by R. Alcaro 35

10 North African partners often understand the Mediterranean Dialogue as part of the historic duty of rich nations to provide direct assistance to overcome poverty and support the poorest. They continue to complain about unequal conditions of competition and unresolved issues of access of products of poor countries to the capacious market of a prosperous European Union. The reforms in the Maghreb countries have proved inconsistent and did not lead to the planned stability. Social and political stability has not been achieved, as evidenced by the political crises that engulfed a significant part of the Arab states in 2011. Free trade zones have not actually been created. There remains a significant deficit of trust between the EU and individual countries of the Southern Mediterranean, especially after the intervention in Libya 56. Over the past ten years, significantly more funds have been spent through the EU financial instrument for the needs of the Mediterranean region than for the entire Eastern policy of the EU. In the approved EU budget for cooperation in the Mediterranean basin for the period from 2007 to 2013. allocated 16 billion, which exceeds the amount allocated to the eastern neighbors (including Ukraine) under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The United States spends even more on aid to the states of the Mediterranean region 57. The EU representatives, in turn, emphasize the ineffectiveness of governance in the recipient countries, the negligent use or even theft of international aid, insurmountable corruption, and the need to fight illegal migration. Concern in Italy is caused by the evasion of leaders of a number of North African countries from agreeing on a policy on illegal immigration, primarily in Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. The Italian leadership has developed an expensive project by M. Haubrich-Seco. Roma, Sushko A. Union for the Mediterranean or the Mediterranean for France? URL: 57 Re-Thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprising. P

11 grams of Mare Nostrum, which provides for military-police measures to prevent illegal immigration by strengthening control over North African sea waters. Expenses can reach up to 12 million per month 58. In addition to the financial part, the problem of immigration has a humanitarian and international legal component. As the columnist of the newspaper Il Sole 24 Karima Mual notes, “the named military and humanitarian operation is in reality a bit humanitarian and overly military.” 59 Many in the region perceive the alliance proposed by Europe as the imposition of an artificial identity that is not related to either civilizational or geopolitical nor with sociocultural factors. European politics " good governance”, The imposition of democratic institutions is seen as hostile to the historical traditions of the Arab countries. The Maghreb countries deny the commonality of the Mediterranean culture and emphasize that they belong to the Arab world. The development of the Mediterranean dialogue is impeded by the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which from time to time blocks European-Mediterranean events 60. Italian experts believe that “the promotion of democracy should remain a strategic objective of the foreign policy of Western powers, but it should not occupy the central place, as it was before 2011 g. " “Instead, a more pragmatic approach should prevail, based on policies that offer greater opportunities to Arabs, especially through more intensive cultural exchanges and greater openness on the topic of migration.” 61 Italy's policy towards Libya is highlighted among the most privileged and responsible relations. Analysts predict a more active Italian foreign policy, as in the framework of the Common Foreign 58 Gaiani G. Mare Nostrum: pro et contro della missione militare dell Italia. Commentary ISPI. 22 ottobre P Moual K. Mare Nostrum: cercasi risposta politica. Commentary ISPI. 22 ottobre P Re-Thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprising. P. 144, Scegliere per contare. R

12 policies and security policies of the EU 62, and bilateral in the direction of Syria, Turkey, Iran, Cyprus. As for the improvement of the legal system, analysts predict further work on bringing Italian law in line with international norms, for example, in terms of the activities of the European Court of Human Rights 63. Researchers note that until now migration policy has been a secondary place in the government , which through Brussels will be obliged to more persistently lobby its own interests regarding the patrolling of maritime borders. The government should work at the EU level to “re-nationalize” European migration and mobility policies 64. Analysts are concerned about the persisting trade imbalance with China. A new object of concern on the part of Rome is the strengthening of Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe, which directly affects Italian interests. As for the role of Italy in global governance, analysts note the steady desire of its leadership to be in the "parent group". Fundamental for a country is consistency in its behavior and compliance with the numerous obligations it has undertaken in the framework of global initiatives. Researchers believe that new international challenges and threats, changes in the military-theoretical and military-technical areas make it necessary to make changes in the concept of defense and security. The fundamentals of Italian security and defense policy were laid out in the White Paper, which has not been updated since 2002. 65. The proposed changes should affect the “national model of intervention”, incl. inscribed in international law, which to this day is covered up with unconvincing con- 62 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. 63 Scegliere per contare. P Ibid. R White Book. URL: menti / libro_bianco / pagine / premessa.aspx. 38

13 concepts of “peacekeeping operations”, “creeping operations”, “peace enforcement” 66. In December 2012, a collective monograph entitled “The Use of Force and Legitimate Defense in Contemporary International Law” was presented in the Senate Library, edited by renowned experts in the field of international law A. Lanciotti and A. Tanzi 67. The study has an important practical interest for improving international legal issues in connection with modern military challenges. The priority directions of the military-technical development of the Italian armed forces are substantiated in the document "New Strategic Concept" of the General Staff of Defense, adopted in 2005. 68. The main focus is on achieving technological superiority over a conventional enemy, primarily in the field of "network wars" and operating systems for warfare (NCW / NEC) 69. In 2010, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract with SELEX Sistemi Integrati, a Finmeccanica subsidiary, to supply the Italian armed forces with digital systems under the Forza NEC 70 project. The program will run for 25 years. and its total cost is 22 billion 71. An ambitious military program challenges the national industry, without technological re-equipment of which and innovative logistics solutions, the plan is impossible Coticchia F., Moro FN La piccola rivoluzione possibile del libro bianco della difesa. ISPI. Commentary. 9 aprile P URL: tes / default / files / pubblicazioni / commentary_coticchia_moro_09.04.pdf; Scegliere per contare. P Uso della forza e legittima difesa nel diritto internazionale contemporaneo. A cura di A. Lanciotti e A. Tanzi. Napoli, Stato Maggiore della Difesa. Il Concetto strategico del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa. Piedimonte Matese, Imago Media Editrice, Nones M., Marrone A. La trasformazione delle Forze Armate: il programma Forza NEC. Guaderni IAI. Roma, P. 48, 58. NEC Network Enable Capability; NCW Network Centric Warfare. 70 URL: 71 Nones M., Marrone A. Op. cit. P Nones M., Marrone A. Op. cit. P

14 Analysts critically assess Italy's place in the international investment markets, pointing to insufficient political support for the "internationalization" of Italian business and investment from the state. The situation began to change for the better in 2013. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the main vehicle for “internationalization”. On behalf of the head of government, at the end of 2013, together with the Ministry of Economy, it developed a draft law “The Destiny of Italy”, which was signed on February 21, 2014 by President of the Republic G. Napolitano 73. The leitmotif of the document: “Italy can get great benefits from globalization”, “ opening up to globalization does not only mean promoting Italy to the world by exporting our goods and investing in new markets, but it also means promoting peace to Italy. ” A special website has been opened on the government portal to promote and promote the main provisions of the law, a “direct line” has been established 74. The main directions of the Law can be summarized as follows: state support for enterprises that are in the launching phase or are already working in innovative fields; allocation of funds for the implementation of digital technologies in small and medium-sized enterprises and retraining of personnel; the allocation of special funds, loans or the provision of tax incentives to those enterprises that invest in innovation; creating conditions for stimulating renewable energy; provision of funds for redemption by the workers themselves of crisis enterprises and the creation of cooperatives by them. Even such peculiar items as a ban on raising excise taxes on beer and providing students with a 19% discount on the purchase of books 75 are included. Naturally, Italian researchers raise the question of Italy's energy dependence on gas supplies from Russia. Ukrainian events exacerbated the dis- 73 Destinazione Italia. See: URL: loads / 2013/10 / destinazione-italia phpapp02.pdf. 74 URL: 75 Destinazione Italia. 40

15 cussias regarding the search for alternative sources. They pin certain hopes for weakening this dependence on the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline, through which gas from Azerbaijan will flow to Apulia, one of the underdeveloped Italian regions. The Institute of International Relations (IAI) has held about a dozen conferences for two years and has issued about the same number of analytical materials, addressing directly the energy and political situation in Azerbaijan and its relations with the EU. The implementation of the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline project is regarded as “the most important foreign policy success” of Italy. Analysts note that the new energy corridor will not be the end point, but the basis for cooperation that extends beyond the Caspian Sea and Turkey, to North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, where there are new energy opportunities, including Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon. In order to ensure energy security, Italy must expand cooperation with Iran. Within the EU, the Italian government should actively act to improve European energy governance, develop EU solidarity policy mechanisms in the event of complications with energy suppliers in April 2014. IMO published an analytical report entitled "Southern Gas Corridor: A Lifeline for Europe?" 77. At the request of IMO, the report was prepared by the Director of the American Eurasian Center D. Koranai. His main thesis boils down to the fact that the Ukrainian crisis should prompt the EU to accelerate the development of alternative channels for access to energy resources, including the Caspian and Central Asia regions. According to D. Koronai, the main challenge to the Southern Gas Corridor project may be the high potential for conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, caused by the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh issue, competition with China and great opportunities for Russia, if desired, to disorganize. P Koranyi D. The Southern Gas Corridor: Europe s Lifeline? IAI Working Papers April

16 Call regions on the Ukrainian model 78. At the end of March 2014, European leaders discussed the issue of reducing energy dependence on Russia and instructed the European Commission to develop a specific action plan by the end of June 2014. The involvement of an American expert does not in the least detract from the high level of Caucasian and Turkish research carried out by Italian specialists. I was personally convinced of this by participating in a conference at the University of Trieste (Gorizia) in December 2013 together with F.L. Grassi of the University of Rome "La Sapienza" and M. di Liddio of the Center for International Studies (Ce.S.I). Assessing the consequences of the cooling of relations between Russia and the EU, M. di Liddio draws attention to "the main risks associated with the possibility of interrupting gas supplies to Europe." He calls for the use of existing diplomatic tools to normalize the situation in connection with the Ukrainian crisis 79. Speaking on April 17, 2014 on Radio Città, M. di Liddio drew attention to the natural origin of pro-Russian movements in Eastern Ukraine, noted that the federalization of Ukraine is in line with intentions Moscow to restrain the entry of its western neighbor into European structures. He linked the annexation of Crimea to the strengthening of Russia's military-geopolitical role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. None of the analysts question the basic foreign policy constant, namely “participation in the Atlantic Alliance and the obligations of the Community” (J. Napolitano). At the same time, as noted in one of the reports, Italy “traditionally individualizes three different models for the implementation of Italian foreign policy: an asymmetric union; bilateral autonomy; active versatility. The authors of the report consider it pragmatic to use the so-called. centripetal "Levantine approach": 78 Koranyi D. Op. cit. P Di Liddio M. I rischi connessi alla crisi di Crimea. URL: 42

17 “in fact, Italian foreign policy seems to be moving in a circle between three points; moving away from one or the other, it changes its characteristics ”80. The foreign policy program, linked to economic, migration, military issues, was formed before M. Renzi came to power. Italy openly articulates and defends its foreign policy interests in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Ensuring energy, migration and international security determines the eastern vector of its policy from the Middle East to Central Asia. Based on the foregoing, the experts formulate two main foreign policy tasks for Italy. The first is to restore international confidence in Italy by consistently implementing internal reforms. The second boils down to updating the overall foreign policy strategy to take into account new European and international challenges. First of all, we are talking about a significant revision of migration and defense policies. In exchange for the implementation of specific reforms, Italy is counting on tax breaks from Brussels. It can be predicted that the period of Italy's EU presidency will be used by Rome's diplomacy to achieve the designated goals. One of them was clearly defined by Foreign Minister F. Mogherini on May 8, 2014: “In the coming weeks of the Italian presidency in July, I will travel to all the capitals of the Western Balkans to give a concrete sign of our commitments, which will be not only Italian, but EU ”81. In the first days of May, the Foreign Minister expressed her position on the situation in Libya, Egypt, Ukraine, and the Middle East. Italy was and remains an important actor in contemporary world politics, actively participating in the collective provision of 80 Bonvicini G., Silvestri S., Bruni F., etc. L Italia in un Mondo che cambia. Suggerimenti per la politica estera italiana. IAI, ISPI, Nomesina, giugno P URL: 43

18 respect of international security and using the international environment to ensure their own interests. FOREIGN POLICY MATTEO RENTZI: CONTINUITY OR A NEW COURSE? E.A. Maslova * It may seem that not enough time has passed to draw conclusions about the foreign policy of the new cabinet of Matteo Renzi, whose members of the government took the oath on February 22, 2014. However, it is necessary first of all to take into account the very intensive pace of Renzi's work, which is revealed in the formula “ on the reform per month ”. Among other things, one of the Italian sayings says: "Il buongiorno si vede dal mattino" (literally, "a good day is seen in the morning"). It seems that the main directions of the new government's foreign policy are already outlined. Together with the new Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, his new team came to Palazzo Chigi. On the eve of the formation of the government, there were suggestions that some ministers would retain their posts. Indeed, it was succeeded, for example, by Angelino Alfano, who in the new government took over as Minister of the Interior. Among other things, it was widely discussed that Emma Bonino, the former European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, Minister for European Affairs in the second government of Romano Prodi, and Minister of Foreign Affairs under the government of Enrico Letta, will remain Foreign Minister. As a result, a complete surprise for everyone (including E. Bonino herself) was the appointment of Federica Mogherini to the post of Foreign Minister, previously unknown not only to the world community, but also in Italy itself, which was responsible for European and international affairs. in the secretariat of Democracy- * Elena Aleksandrovna Maslova, Ph.D. in Political Science, Lecturer at the Department of European Integration at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Researcher at the Department of Black Sea and Mediterranean Studies at the Institute of Europe RAS. 44


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